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The present analysis is a reframing of an earlier study conducted by the 
author to compensate for perceived deficiencies in previous studies on 
police decisions in sexual assault complaints. Specifically, qualitative 
comparative analysis was employed at the micro-social level to reveal 
justification scenarios, employed by investigating officers, which resulted 
in attrition at the police level. It was found that police employed the legal 
model in justifying “unfounded” designations while police employed both 
legal and extralegal models in justifying designations of “departmental 
discretion.” Further research, expanding the database through interviews 
and participant observation, is necessary to fully explore justification 
scenarios for police designations of sexual assault complaints. Key 
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Police Decision-Making  
 
 
It is well-established that the progress of any reported case through the criminal 
justice system reflects a highly selective process of elimination, often referred to as 
“attrition” (Goff, 1997; Griffiths & Verdun-Jones, 1994) or “filtering” (Clark & Lewis, 
1977; Gunn & Minch, 1988; Minch, Linden, & Johnson, 1987). This has been especially 
well-documented for sexual assault cases reported to North American police (Chandler & 
Torney, 1981; Clark & Lewis; Gunn & Minch; Minch et al., 1987; Stanley, 1985). 
The police play an important role in this filtering process. In Canada, as well as in 
many states throughout the U.S., once an initial complaint is reported the police become 
involved in a number of important decisions (Griffiths & Verdun-Jones, 1994) that may 
affect whether a complaint results in a charge, and hence proceeds to prosecution, or 
whether a complaint remains at the police level with no further action taken. In this sense, 
then, the police act as the “gateway” to the criminal justice system (Kerstetter, 1990) and 
the fate of any reported complaint, in terms of its movement through the criminal justice 
system, essentially lay in the hands of the police who exercise substantial discretionary 
power (Cromwell & Dunham, 1997; Goff, 1997; Griffiths & Verdun-Jones; Pepinsky, 
1984; Smith, 1987). 
While discretion exists at every stage of the criminal justice system (Cromwell & 
Dunham, 1997; Goff, 1997) it is particularly important at the police level, given that 
police act as initial gatekeepers. Police use discretion throughout the variety of their day-
to-day tasks (Goldstein, 1977; Smith, 1987) and discretion forms the basis of their 
decisions: decisions about whether to enforce the law (Cromwell & Dunham), whether to 
arrest a suspect (Goldstein; Roberg & Kuykendall, 1993; Stansfield, 1996), whether to 
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use force in an encounter (Goldstein; Griffiths & Verdun-Jones, 1994), whether to devote 
resources to an investigation (Stansfield), and whether to lay a charge in any particular 
circumstance (Griffiths & Verdun-Jones).  
In the policing literature, there is a considerable amount of research on the 
decision-making of police patrol officers (see Bittner, 1970; Ericson, 1982; Fleming, 
1981; Manning & Van Maanen, 1978; Roberg & Keykendall, 1993; Smith, 1987; Stalans 
& Finn, 1995; Stansfield, 1996). Less common, however, are probes into the decision-
making of investigating officers. While in many jurisdictions, patrol and investigating 
officers are one in the same (Goff, 1997; Griffiths & Verdun-Jones, 1994), the decisions 
made at the patrol level and the investigation level may be somewhat different in 
substance and outcome. Patrol officers make decisions in the initial encounter, many of 
which do not end up in official police reports. Investigating officers make decisions 
regarding the investigation of complaints and these decisions inevitably end up, in some 
form, in official investigation reports. Thus, it would be interesting to probe the decision-
making process of investigating officers, in particular, the decisions that do not lead to 
the prosecution of complaints, but rather to their stagnation at the police level. 
It is at the investigation level, where decisions are often “accounted for” in 
official reports that the present analysis takes its start. According to Drass and Spencer 
(1987), social control agents, such as police, are required to make decisions that are open 
to scrutiny from colleagues and supervisors, and therefore must justify their decisions by 
providing “accounts” which make these decisions rational and reasonable. The current 
analysis addresses the justifications for decisions made by investigating officers in sexual 
assault complaints. What kinds of justifications or “accounts” do investigating officers 
offer for their decisions? More importantly, are there recognizable combinations of 
justifications which officers use in making different decisions? It is anticipated that an 
exploration of the justifications for decisions made by investigating officers in sexual 
assault complaints, with particular attention on combinations of factors, will provide 
significant insight into the process of police decision-making as well as shed light on the 
process of attrition in the criminal justice system. 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
The Attrition of Sexual Assault Complaints 
 
Sexual assault, like many other crimes, is subject to a considerable amount of 
attrition as complaints pass through the criminal justice system (Clark & Lewis, 1977; 
Goff, 1997). Many sexual assault complaints are “filtered out” at various stages (Clark & 
Lewis) so that only a small number of complaints make it to the final stage of the 
criminal justice process. 
Investigating police officers play an important role in the attrition of sexual 
assault complaints. According to Clark and Lewis (1977), one strategy employed by 
investigating officers to filter out sexual assault complaints is the use of the “unfounded” 
designation. Officially, a reported sexual assault can be classified as “unfounded” when a 
law enforcement agency receives a complaint and subsequent investigation discloses that 
no offence has occurred: Unofficially, however, authorities classify complaints as 
“unfounded” when they believe the report is false or when they cannot verify the incident 
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(Lizotte, 1985). Essentially, a sexual assault complaint given an “unfounded” designation 
will be “filed” and hence remain at the police level rather than move on to prosecution. 
 
The Unfounded Rate for Sexual Assaults 
 
According to the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1992) 
sexual assault is far more likely than other violent crimes to be classified as “unfounded”. 
Robin (1977) reports that the proportion of index offences (homicide, forcible rape/sexual 
assault, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft) considered 
“unfounded” by police in the United States range from 2% of larcenies to 18% of sexual 
assaults. Likewise, Roberts (1990) reports that the unfounded rate in Canada is higher for 
sexual assault than for other crimes against a person such as homicide or assault. In a 
1992 Canadian document the Department of Justice reports that “of the 29,111 reports of 
sexual assault made to the police in 1988, 15% were declared unfounded” (p. 49). This 
national “unfounded” rate is far more conservative than the figure reported in the Clark 
and Lewis Toronto data in which a high 63.8% of the sexual assault reports were 
classified as “unfounded” (Stanley, 1985). A further study conducted by Minch et al. 
(1987) revealed that 27% of the 211 initial sexual assaults brought to the attention of the 
Winnipeg Police Department in 1987 were eventually delegated as “unfounded”. In 
addition, Gunn and Minch (1988), after examining both “founded” and “unfounded” 
sexual assault cases in Winnipeg, concluded that a significant 53% of the sexual assault 
reports did not proceed beyond the police level. 
 
Factors Affecting Police Decisions in Sexual Assault Complaints 
 
The rationale behind designating a sexual assault complaint as “unfounded” by 
police investigators may be either subjective or practical (Gunn & Minch, 1988). In 
reviewing the literature on police decision-making in sexual assault cases, the reasons for 
“unfounded” designations can be divided into four main categories: (1) Police do not 
believe the sexual assault complaint, (2) No formal complaint was made by the victim or 
victim drops the charges, (3) Victim apprehension about proceeding with prosecution, 
and (4) Prosecutorial concerns by police. 
The first and foremost reason for police to designate a sexual assault complaint as 
“unfounded” is that they simply do not believe, based on the victim’s account of the 
incident and available evidence, that a sexual assault has occurred or that evidence has 
revealed the complaint to be false (Gunn & Minch, 1988; Minch et al., 1987). For 
example, Gunn and Minch found in their examination of unfounded sexual assault 
complaints, that 5% of the unfounded reports were labelled as “false complaints.”  
In addition to those complaints believed to be false, sexual assault complaints 
may be designated as “unfounded” when no formal complaint by the victim is made or 
when the victim decides to drop the original sexual assault charges (Gunn & Minch, 
1988; Minch et al., 1987). In both cases, the complaint is stalled at the police level either 
because the victim does not come forward as the primary witness or because the case 
cannot proceed to the prosecution level: The police, therefore, choose not to follow 
through with the investigation of the complaint. 
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In many cases, the victim’s apprehension about proceeding with the charge may 
lead to a police designation of a sexual assault complaint as “unfounded” (Gunn & 
Minch, 1988; Kerstetter, 1990; LaFree, 1981; Minch et al., 1987). Gunn and Minch, for 
example, found that in 10% of the cases examined, a combination of police and victim 
apprehension in proceeding with a charge led to an “unfounded” designation. Likewise, 
LaFree (1981) and Kerstetter maintain that a victim’s willingness to prosecute is a 
significant factor in official police decisions to “found” or “unfound” a sexual assault 
complaint. Kerstetter points out that since detectives have more cases than they can 
handle, “they have little incentive to pursue a case if the complainant does not want to 
prosecute because the complainant’s cooperation is crucial to a successful investigation” 
(p. 290).  
The majority of the reasons for classifying a sexual assault complaint as 
“unfounded” can be attributed to prosecutorial concerns by the police. When the police 
foresee that the prosecutor will have difficulty in proceeding with the charge, this may 
lead to a decision to stymie the complaint at the police level with an “unfounded” 
classification. Such concerns regarding prosecution may involve any of the following: (1) 
Insufficient evidence, which may include: lack of physical injury, lack of corroborating 
medical evidence, suspect not identified, and suspect not apprehended (see Chandler & 
Torney, 1981; Clark & Lewis, 1977; Gunn & Minch, 1988; Kerstetter, 1990; Kerstetter & 
Van Winkle, 1990; LaFree, 1981; Minch et al., 1987; Rose & Randall, 1982); (2) 
Victim’s credibility at question, which may include: victim’s account inconsistent, victim 
does not initially contact the police, possible ulterior motives, report of sexual assault not 
prompt, emotional state of victim not “typical,” alcohol/drug use by victim, victim has 
criminal record, and victim has history of mental illness (see Chandler & Torney; Clark 
& Lewis; Frohmann, 1991; Gunn & Minch; Holmstrom & Burgess, 1978; Kerstetter; 
LaFree; Minch et al.; Rose & Randall; Stanley, 1985); (3) Question of consent, which 
may include: lack of resistance by victim, victim-offender relationship, degree of 
violence, victim-offender contact, risk-taking by victim, and victim considered 
promiscuous (see Chandler & Torney; Clark & Lewis; Holmstrom & Burgess; Kerstetter; 
LaFree; Minch et al.; Rioux, 1975; Rose & Randall; Wyre & Swift, 1990); and (4) 
Additional factors, which may include: occupational status of victim, marital status of 
victim, number of offenders, criminal record of offender, multiple sexual acts, other 
criminal acts committed, and racial composition of victim-suspect dyad (see Clark & 
Lewis; Holmstrom & Burgess; Kerstetter; LaFree; Rioux; Stanley). 
 
Models of Police Decision-Making: Legal and Extralegal Models 
 
Clearly, the decision to treat any sexual assault complaint as legitimate appears to 
be influenced by both extralegal and legal factors. After examining official decisions in 
sexual assault cases, several researchers conclude that such decisions are strongly 
influenced by extralegal considerations, mostly focused on victim characteristics and 
attributes (Chandler & Torney, 1981; Clark & Lewis, 1977; Hinch, 1988; Myers & 
LaFree, 1982). 
For example, Hinch (1988) calls attention to the variety of extralegal concerns 
criminal justice decision-makers have about the victim’s reputation and credibility. 
Hinch’s findings stress that victim misconduct clearly affects decisions made by police. 
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The fact that victims’ behaviour, such as resistance and sexual misconduct, are more 
commonly noted for sexual assault than for other offences (Myers & LaFree, 1982) 
clearly underlines the primary significance that extralegal factors, in the form of victim 
attributes, have in criminal justice decision-making. 
Despite evidence that extralegal factors play an important role in police decision-
making in sexual assault complaints, LaFree (1981) contends that “the legal model best 
describes the official police reaction to sexual assault” (p. 592). Although LaFree 
highlights the significance of victim attributes in police decision-making, he concludes 
that the most important determinants of police decisions are based on legal 
considerations, particularly evidentiary concerns. Likewise, Myers and LaFree (1982) 
conclude that, “Primary differences in official reactions centered not on victim 
characteristics per se, but rather on evidentiary concerns…Officials base their decisions 
on the context within which the crime occurred and its ability to generate evidence” (p. 
1300). 
Similarly, Kerstetter (1990) and Kerstetter and Van Winkle (1990) stress the 
importance of evidentiary sufficiency in making decisions concerning sexual assault 
complaints.  
According to these researchers, then, police make decisions about sexual assault 
complaints not on the basis of victim attributes per se, but on the basis of more pragmatic 
notions of how the behaviour or characteristics of the victim affects the evidentiary basis 
of the case. Thus, police are concerned with the victim and the victim’s attributes only in 
so far as it affects the prosecutorial status of the case: whether the victim’s characteristics 
and behaviour help make a strong or weak case. 
 
Typifications 
 
In addition to models of police decision-making based on extralegal and legal 
factors, a substantial amount of research literature suggests that police also rely on 
typifications in making decisions regarding their day-to-day tasks (Bittner, 1970; 
Griffiths & Verdun-Jones, 1994; Manning & Van Maanen, 1978; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; 
Stalans & Finn, 1995). According to Griffiths and Verdun-Jones, “typifications are 
constructs or formulations of events based on experience and involve what is typical or 
common about routinely encountered events” (p. 169). It is suggested that police officers 
routinely “typify” offenders and victims as well as offence situations, paying most 
attention to what they consider deviations from a “typical” offence scenario. It is 
acknowledged that such typifications may be based on stereotypes and discriminatory 
views of people and circumstances (Lundman, 1980). Nevertheless, these typfications 
ultimately influence police decisions and subsequent police actions. Indeed, Bittner 
contends that the basis of police decision-making rests on police officers’ “intuitive grasp 
of situational exigencies”: “Police develop a set of beliefs which guide their actions, in 
effect, a set of decision-making heuristics which influence their definition of situations 
and eventual course of action”. (p. 46) 
The use of typifications by police officers has been well-documented in both wife 
assault (Stalans & Finn, 1995; Waaland & Keeley, 1985) and sexual assault (Chandler & 
Torney, 1981; Clark & Lewis, 1977; Frohmann, 1991; Waegel, 1981) cases. Clark and 
Lewis contend that police frequently draw on typifications of “rape-relevant behaviour” 
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in deciding whether to maintain an investigation in a sexual assault complaint. This 
entails comparing reported complaints to a “typical” sexual assault scenario in terms of 
the usual or typical offender, victim, and circumstances that are involved in a sexual 
assault. These typfications are frequently based on myths (Canadian Advisory Council on 
the Status of Women, 1992) and inaccurate information that holds that sexual assault is 
usually committed by a stranger, out of the blue, which involves considerable physical 
injury to the victim and that the victim is visibly and hysterically upset. In this way, 
police efficiently classify each sexual assault brought to their attention as “real rapes” or 
“deals,” which police believe are contrived false complaints (Kelly & Radford, 1990; 
Rose & Randall, 1982). Such scenario typifications also include: (1) Typifications of 
post-incident interaction: That is, the typical interaction pattern between victim and 
suspect after a sexual assault incident is one of no contact; (2) Typifications of rape 
reporting: Both police and prosecutors expect sexual assault victims to report the incident 
promptly, any delay in reporting may lessen the victim’s credibility or may lead officials 
to question the victim’s motives; (3) Typifications of victim’s demeanour: The typical 
emotional state of a victim after a sexual assault incident is one of hysterics; and (4) 
Typifications of offenders: Sexual assault offenders are strangers to the victim, who use 
violent force, and have a violent criminal history. 
Chandler and Torney (1981) also suggest that such typifications extend to sex-
role stereotyping, in which implicit or explicit biases toward women are expressed in 
police decisions; for example, the “unfounding” of a sexual assault charge because the 
woman is a prostitute or the negation of a promiscuous teenager’s allegation of rape. 
In sum, decision-making by police suggests that police are influenced by both 
legally relevant and irrelevant factors, and that police rely on typifications of sexual 
assault scenarios to make the decision to proceed or not proceed with sexual assault 
complaints. 
 
The Problem with Existing Literature 
 
What the literature reveals is a laundry list of factors important to police decision-
making that can ultimately be grouped into two abstract categories; legal and extralegal. 
However, the existing literature relies mainly on a linear analysis, looking at factors 
individually (such as the effect of victim credibility or victim cooperation on police 
decisions to “unfound” a complaint), in isolation from one another rather than in 
combination with one another. While this provides some important information regarding 
police decision-making in sexual assault complaints, it also assumes that police make 
decisions in a vacuum and according to single criteria. Such additive, linear analyses do 
not recognize the “lumpiness” (Britt, 1997) of decision-making. That is, decisions do not 
always follow a neat and tidy X leads to Y pattern (linear) or several Xs lead to Y pattern 
(additive). Such analyses fail to take into consideration that a combination of factors may 
be relevant to police decisions or that several factors may overlap to produce a decision. 
Although some of the literature suggests such a combinatorial approach (see Rose & 
Randall, 1982), the bulk of the research focuses on single factors impacting police 
decision-making. Clearly, what is needed is an approach to account for such “lumpiness” 
in decision-making, an approach that allows for analyzing police decision-making from a 
combinatorial standpoint. 
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Methodology 
 
Data Source 
 
The present analysis looks at 35 sexual assault complaints reported to the Windsor 
Police Service in 1992 that did not, for one reason or another, proceed to the prosecution 
stage. The data used here were part of a larger study completed as a master’s thesis 
(Soulliere, 1994), which examined 243 incidents reported to the Windsor Police Service 
in 1992 that were classified as sexual assault complaints. The aim of this earlier study 
was to explore the general characteristics of sexual assault as they pertained to the local 
area and to examine decision-making at the police level, to determine which model of 
decision-making police were most likely to employ in classifying sexual assault 
complaints. Given the criticisms often directed at the criminal justice system, in response 
to sexual assault victimizations, the researcher was highly interested in finding out 
whether police employed legal or extralegal factors in making decisions concerning 
sexual assault complaints. Like previous studies of police decision-making, the original 
analysis conducted for the thesis was additive1. After completing a graduate-level course 
which explored qualitative analyses based on combinations of factors, the researcher saw 
merit in applying this technique to the original data collected for the thesis. Thus, a 
reframing of the original analysis was done to suit a combinatorial style. Specifically, 
qualitative comparative analysis as developed by Ragin (1987) was employed to 
facilitate this reframing. 
Data consisted mainly of police investigation reports on sexual assault complaints 
that did not move on to prosecution, but remained at the police level. In particular, the 
designation of the complaint was attended to as well as notes made by investigating 
officers2 in hopes to gain insight regarding the justifications for such designations. The 
focus was on justifications that investigating officers gave for particular designations 
rather than on the general characteristics of each complaint. It is recognized that this 
focus may not capture all or most of the relevant reasons for police decisions in sexual 
assault complaints, but it was necessary to focus on what the data were, in fact, able to 
reveal. In this context, inferences cannot be made regarding what investigating officers 
are thinking apart from what they write in incident reports. Drass and Spencer (1987) 
contend that “accounts” do not provide direct evidence of the determinants of decisions, 
but they do reveal some indication of the processes involved in making decisions. For 
this reason, only complaints in which justifications were clearly indicated by 
investigating officers in the incident reports were included in the analysis. While this 
                                                 
1 As a master’s graduate student, the researcher was exposed mostly to traditional linear, additive analyses 
and it was these analyses that were recommended and promoted within the programme. 
 
2 The main body of an Investigation Report contains victim and offender characteristics, a description of 
the suspect, an offence synopsis, classification of the report, as well as other details pertaining to the 
offence. In addition, attached to an Investigation Report may be victim/witness statements, notes by 
investigating officers (police notations and comments regarding the case), as well as other documents 
prepared for prosecution such as record cards, interim release forms, arrest reports, pre-sentence reports and 
reports prepared by Children’s Aid Society. It should be noted that Investigation Reports vary in 
completeness. 
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greatly reduced the pool of complaints that did not proceed to prosecution3, it was felt 
that the remaining complaints would nevertheless provide useful data. Therefore, 
although the data are limited, the value of the current analysis lay in its ability to reveal 
the combinations of factors involved in decision-making, thus contributing substantively 
to the existing literature. 
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
Qualitative comparative analysis or QCA (Ragin, 1987) is an analytic technique 
that uses systematic and logical case comparisons based on the rules of Boolean algebra, 
to identify the combinations of explanatory variables that are unique to an outcome 
(Musheno, Gregware, & Drass, 1991). QCA has several key features. First, in qualitative 
comparative analysis, each case is conceived holistically, as a configuration of causal 
conditions not as a collection of scores on variables. QCA does not assume that the effect 
of an explanatory variable is the same regardless of the values of other variables: Rather, 
QCA assumes that variables exert their influences in combination with other variables. 
Indeed, Ragin (1993) asserts that “no value on any variable (categorical or interval) can 
be understood in isolation, but only in the context of the values of other relevant 
variables” (p. 306). QCA, then, rests on combinatorial rather than additive logic. 
Whereas additive logic focuses on the contributions of each variable individually, 
combinatorial logic focuses on the contribution of unique combinations of variables 
thought of as “causal conjunctures” (Ragin, 1987) or “scenarios” (Britt, 1998). The goal 
of qualitative comparative analysis, then, is to identify which combinations are crucial for 
distinguishing one outcome from another (Musheno et al., 1991).  
In addition, QCA assumes causal heterogeneity, the notion that there are 
alternative combinations of causal conditions (or alternative scenarios) which may lead to 
the same outcome (Ragin, 1987, 1989, 1993). Furthermore, the logic of QCA is 
deterministic rather than probabilistic: The explanation of the outcome, in terms of 
configurations of causal conditions, is invariant rather than more or less probable. 
Qualitative comparative analysis strives to be parsimonious by discovering the smallest 
number of combinations of conditions that produce the outcome to be explained (Becker, 
1998; Ragin, 1987, 1989, 1993). Ragin (1989) informs researchers that qualitative 
comparative analysis should not result in a “laundry list” of possible relevant causal 
conditions. Rather, he contends that “the investigator moves back and forth between 
specification of causal variables ...and examination of cases to build a combinatorial 
model with a minimum of causal combinations with contradictory outcomes” (p. 379). 
With such parsimony in mind, it should not be surprising that qualitative comparative 
analysis employs a discourse of necessary and sufficient conditions (Amenta & Poulsen, 
1994). Coverdill and Finlay (1995) assert that the main task of QCA is to determine 
which aspects of the configurations are logically necessary and/or sufficient. Amenta and 
Poulsen argue that a discourse of necessary and sufficient conditions is clearly 
advantageous, “more causally profound than a discourse of explained variance” (p. 23). 
                                                 
3 These criteria, in effect, cut the number of complaints that did not proceed to prosecution by more than 
one-half. 
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QCA was essentially developed by Ragin as a synthetic approach to bridge the 
gap between case-oriented modes of research, often described as intensive, qualitative, 
holistic, idiographic, non-statistical, and particular. Variable-oriented modes of 
investigation are often depicted in the opposite as extensive, quantitative, analytical, 
nomothetic, statistical, and general (Ragin, 1987, 1989, 1993; Ragin, Shulman, 
Weinberg, & Gran, 2003). As such, it is thought to hold several advantages over both 
traditional quantitative and qualitative analyses. First, qualitative comparative analysis 
has the potential to circumvent some of the problems associated with these traditional 
strategies. For example, while statistical interaction is similar to causal conjunctures, such 
interaction effects may suffer from the problem of multicollinearity. Ragin (1993) argues 
that “if many causal conditions are relevant, statistical interaction creates an 
indecipherable cacophony of collinearity” (p. 307). QCA, with its Boolean technique, is 
able to overcome the problem of multicollinearity, being able to focus on multiple 
combinations of causal conditions. Unlike conventional statistical analysis, qualitative 
comparative analysis encourages the researcher to consider the context in which specific 
causal relationships will hold. QCA intuitively recognizes that “life is lumpy” (Britt, 
1997) and cannot be explained through traditional additive, linear analyses upon which 
most quantitative statistical approaches, such as multiple regression and path analysis, are 
based. To be sure, Ragin (1993) contends that “causes rarely operate in a simple additive 
fashion; rather, they usually combine and intersect to produce change” (p. 306). As such, 
the questions these additive analyses answer are often not the ones people want answers 
to (Becker, 1998), especially if one is looking for combinations of causes rather than their 
individual contributions. 
QCA can also enhance traditional qualitative analysis. For example, qualitative 
comparative analysis is able to handle a large number of cases, which generally cripples 
most qualitative research. In addition, QCA offers a more systematic replicable approach 
to data analysis (Coverdill, Finlay, & Martin, 1994) as well as it compels “a consideration 
of theoretical stories that may have been overlooked by the shifting-through-the-data 
approach” (p. 78) common to most qualitative analyses. Thus, QCA brings some of the 
methodological discipline and rigor of quantitative analysis to qualitative analysis and 
some of the causal complexity and inductive sensitivity of qualitative analysis to 
quantitative analysis (Coverdill et al., 1994), essentially being able to travel the middle 
road between generality and complexity (Ragin & Zaret 1983; Ragin et al., 2003). 
Secondly, with its combinatorial logic, qualitative comparative analysis opens the 
door to new ways of thinking. Coverdill and Finlay (1995) argue that QCA acts as a 
“catalyst for substantive reflection,” a kind of “analytic and theoretical goading,” forcing 
researchers “to explore systematically initial hunches, prodding us to go beyond what we 
originally understood our data to suggest” (p. 21). In essence, qualitative comparative 
analysis is a “trick” (Becker, 1998) to be used by social scientists to maintain a dialogue 
between ideas and evidence (Britt, 1998) and between method, evidence, and analyst 
(Coverdill et al., 1994). Coverdill et al. contend that QCA forces the social scientist to 
“think very hard about cases, measurement of variables and the meaning of particular 
case attributes in a way that is not required by either traditional qualitative or quantitative 
analysis” (p. 78). In this way, QCA offers the prospect of both better data analysis and 
better theory. 
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Methods and Results 
 
The Implementation of QCA 
 
Although Ragin (1987) presented QCA as an approach appropriate to the 
qualitative study of macro-social phenomena, such as whole societies and institutions, 
such comparative analyses are also appropriate and have been applied to micro-social 
phenomena such as small groups and interaction (see Drass & Miethe, 2001; Drass & 
Spencer, 1987; Musheno et al., 1991; Rantala & Hellstrom, 2001). It is therefore an 
appropriate technique to be applied to police decision-making within the context of 
sexual assault complaints. 
 
Selecting Outcome and Conditions 
 
The first step in a qualitative comparative analysis is the selection of outcome(s) 
and causal conditions (Coverdill & Finlay, 1995). 
It was noted that, in designating sexual assault complaints, Windsor Police 
officers did not adhere to a strict founded-unfounded dichotomy, but rather classified 
complaints under a variety of “status codes.” Although there are fifteen different status 
codes listed on the investigation report template, only six codes were relevant to the 1992 
sample of complaints: “unfounded,” “by charge,” “not cleared,” “accused less than 12,” 
“complainant doesn’t proceed,” and “departmental discretion.” Of the six possible 
designations, five essentially resulted in the complaint being dropped at the police level: 
“unfounded”, “not cleared”, “accused less than 12”, “complainant doesn’t proceed”, and 
“departmental discretion”. In fact, the original analysis of the 243 complaints revealed 
that almost 70% of the incidents of sexual assault reported in 1992 did not proceed 
beyond the police level.  
Three of the designations are relatively clear-cut. For example, police designated 
those complaints as “not cleared” that did not result in an arrest or charge because 
identification of the suspect had not been made and/or police had not been able to 
apprehend the suspect. Nearly 10% of the complaints were designated in this way. As 
well, police designated those complaints as “accused less than 12" in which the 
offender(s) were under the age of twelve and therefore legally unable to assume criminal 
responsibility. Less than 1% of the complaints were designated in this way. Furthermore, 
police designated those complaints as “complainant doesn’t proceed” in which 
complainants stated their intention not to proceed4. About 1/4 of the complaints were 
designated in this way. Thus, it may be claimed that it was reasonably clear what lead 
investigating officers to these three designations. 
Less clear-cut, however, were the designations of “unfounded” and “departmental 
discretion.” What leads police to designate a sexual assault complaint as “unfounded” 
rather than “departmental discretion?” In particular, it was believed that police employ a 
combination of factors in justifying such designations. Also, it was felt that a comparison 
                                                 
4 Although it would be interesting to explore the various combinations of reasons victims choose not to 
proceed with their sexual assault complaint, this exploration is somewhat beyond the scope of the current 
analysis and should be addressed in an additional paper. 
 
 
 
Danielle M. Soulliere 426 
of the two outcomes would reveal different combinations of justifications or different 
“justification scenarios.”  
Thus, the outcomes are as follows: 
 
U = Unfounded; represents those complaints that are proved to be false or 
believed to be false; indicated by status code “unfounded. 
 
DD = Departmental Discretion; represents those complaints in which   
 police do not proceed with further investigation of the complaint or do not  
 proceed with charges against the suspect: In essence, “departmental 
 discretion” can be inter-changed with “police do not proceed” indicated by  
 status code “departmental discretion.” 
 
In terms of outcome, there were 35 “useable”5 complaints for the analysis: 10 
“unfounded” complaints and 25 “departmental discretion” complaints. 
Although an abundance of research literature points to possible causal conditions 
related to designations of sexual assault complaints that do not proceed to prosecution it 
was felt that the best approach to identify relevant causal conditions was to “let the data 
speak for themselves.” In this way, relevant conditions could be revealed with maximum 
descriptive validity (Britt, 1997) which could easily be cross-checked against the relevant 
existing literature. 
Coverdill and Finlay (1995) assert that “one cannot use QCA until quite a bit of 
thought and analysis has been completed” (p. 5). They maintain that QCA requires a pre-
QCA stage that “leans heavily on either theoretical deductions or more standard forms of 
qualitative data analysis” (p. 20). Drawing on this advice, preliminary coding of the 
justification for designations of investigating officers in each of the 35 sexual assault 
complaints was accomplished through grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), in particular open, axial, and selective coding as outlined by Strauss (1987). 
Open coding of the “unfounded” and “departmental discretion” complaints 
revealed the following justifications: contradictory evidence, insufficient evidence, 
inconsistencies/ discrepancies in victim’s account, history of false complaints, victim 
intoxicated, victim undergoing psychiatric care, victim is a prostitute, victim is a 
runaway, age of victim, victim has mental/physical handicap, interaction between victim 
and suspect after the assault is not typical, mitigating circumstances regarding the 
suspect, reporting not prompt, victim is not a competent witness, victim’s emotional 
reaction is not typical, and victim is uncooperative with police. All of these initial codes 
are consistent with previous literature in this area. 
As can be seen, such open coding produces quite the laundry list of possible 
conditions. Amenta and Poulsen (1994) caution against pursuing a large number of 
conditions in qualitative comparative analysis: 
 
Combinations of dichotomous variables grow exponentially from a base of  
two; and thus a large number of independent conditions make QCA 
unwieldy and decreases the likelihood that any given combination will 
                                                 
5 “useable” pertains to those complaints in which justifications were clearly indicated by investigating 
officers. 
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have an empirical referent 6  or will be theoretically interpretable. 
Moreover, the larger the number of independent conditions, the more 
likely that each possible combination with a case in it will have only that 
one case7. (p. 23) 
 
Heeding their advice, more abstract categories were developed through axial and 
selective coding as well as through concept respecification8 (Britt, 1997), so that the 
following “causal conditions” were identified as relevant: (1) low prosecutability and (2) 
rape typification.  
 
Low prosecutability (LP) 
 
Low prosecutability (LP) entails perceptions by investigating officers that the 
complaint has a low possibility of successful prosecution. The following may be 
considered indicators of low prosecutability: (1) evidentiary concerns such as insufficient 
evidence or contradictory evidence (E), (2) credibility of complainant at question 
including possible ulterior motive for complaint (C), and (3) complainant perceived as 
incompetent witness because of young age, mental or physical disability or inability to 
articulate testimony (IW). Each of these indicators was treated as “functional 
equivalents;” the presence of any one indicated the presence of low prosecutability (LP). 
 
Rape typification (RT) 
 
Rape typification (RT) entails any indications that investigating officers are 
“typifying” sexual assault victims, offenders, or circumstances in assessing the legitimacy 
of a complaint (see earlier discussion). Specific indicators revealed include typifying: (1) 
emotional reactions of victims; for example, victims should be visibly upset or emotional 
and cooperative with police, (2) legitimate victims; victims should not be intoxicated, 
promiscuous or prostitutes, (3) suspects; for example, suspects should not be too young 
or too old, have a mental or physical disability, or be victims themselves, (4) reporting 
behaviour; for example, reports should be prompt, and (5) interaction after the assault; for 
example, interaction between victim and suspect after the assault should be one of no 
contact. Any deviation from these “typical” scenarios is thought to raise suspicion in 
investigating officers and influence their assessment of sexual assault complaints. Again, 
these indicators were treated as “functional equivalents;” the presence of any one 
indicated the presence of rape typification (RT). 
Both low prosecutability and rape typification are factors found in existing 
literature which influence police decision-making in sexual assault complaints and 
respectively correspond (it could be argued) to the legal and extralegal models of 
decision-making. 
                                                 
6 This is what Ragin (1987) refers to as “remainder configurations.” 
 
7 This is what Ragin (1987) refers to as “limited diversity.” 
 
8 Concept respecification (Britt, 1997) entails a reanalysis of the nature of key concepts which aims to 
specify what indicators are and are not important in defining the term. 
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Dichotomous Coding and Data Matrix 
 
According to Ragin (1987), one of the first tasks in qualitative comparative 
analysis is the preliminary coding of all variables implicated in the analysis. Since 
Boolean algebra permits only two values (0 and 1), qualitative comparative analysis 
requires that all variables (conditions) and all outcomes be dichotomous. This is 
accomplished by coding the conditions and outcomes according to presence/absence or 
high/low. 
Since a considerable amount of thought had already gone into the preliminary 
coding of conditions and outcomes, dichotomous coding of complaints was a relatively 
easy task. For both outcomes, presence of each of the designations is indicated by 1, 
while absence is indicated by 0. Since complaints are given only one designation (the 
status codes are mutually exclusive categories), coding for the presence of unfounded (U) 
and departmental discretion (DD) designations corresponded to the status code checked 
on the investigation report for each complaint. 
The dichotomous coding of the causal conditions was as follows: (1) presence of 
low prosecutability is indicated by 1, absence by 0 and (2) presence of rape typification is 
indicated by 1, absence by 0. As mentioned, indicators were treated as functional 
equivalents so that the presence of any one indicator signified the presence of the 
condition. 
In addition, the indicators of low prosecutability - evidentiary concerns (E), 
complainant’s credibility questioned (C), and complainant perceived as incompetent 
witness (IW) were dichotomized and analyzed by outcome in order to reveal possible 
combinations that are relevant to the unfounded (U) and departmental discretion (DD) 
designations. 
A data matrix was used to summarize the dichotomous coding process. For each 
of the 35 complaints, conditions (low prosecutability, rape typification) were coded as 
present (1) or absent (0) with corresponding outcome (unfounded, departmental 
discretion) indicated by 1. 
 
Truth Table Analysis 
 
Ragin (1987) argues that in order to use Boolean algebra as a technique of 
qualitative comparison, it is necessary to reconstruct a raw data matrix called a “truth 
table”. A truth table summarizes the pattern of outcomes associated with different 
configurations of causal conditions. Essentially, a truth table lists the different 
combinations of causal conditions and the value of the outcome variable for the cases 
conforming to each combination. Table 1 depicts the truth table of the police 
justifications for the unfounded and departmental discretion designations. 
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Table 1 
 
Truth Table for Unfounded and Departmental Discretion Designations 
Conditions Outcome 
Low Prosecutabiliy 
(LP) 
Rape Typification 
(RT) 
Unfounded   (U) Departmental 
Discretion (DD) 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 2 2 
1 0 8 12 
0 1 0 11 
  10 25 
 
Justification scenarios 
 
In looking at the first truth table (Table 1) a couple of recognizable patterns 
emerge. First, when neither low prosecutability (LP) nor rape typification (RT) is present, 
neither an unfounded (U) nor a departmental discretion (DD) designation is made. We 
can assume then that complaints in which prosecutability is relatively high and in which 
the complaint scenario “fits” the typical sexual assault scenario will proceed on to 
prosecution. 
There are two justification scenarios relevant to an unfounded (U) designation: 
(LP)(RT) and (LP)(rt). This means that police justify an unfounded designation by 
pointing to low prosecutability and relying on rape typification (2 cases fit this scenario) 
or by pointing to low prosecutability alone (8 cases fit this scenario). However, these are 
also justification scenarios relevant to a departmental discretion designation. Police also 
justify a departmental discretion designation by pointing to low prosecutability and 
relying on rape typification (2 cases fit this scenario) or by pointing to low prosecutability 
alone (12 cases fit this scenario). 
The problem of contradictory outcomes cannot simply be dismissed (Abell, 1989; 
Coverdill & Finlay, 1995; Ragin, 1987) rather contradictory outcomes must be logically 
accounted for or rationalized. One approach is to postulate further conditions (Abell) to 
ferret out additional unique combinations for each outcome. In the context of this analysis 
a further condition might be the whim of individual investigating officers. Different 
investigating officers may make use of different designations when faced with the same 
justification scenario. In other words, investigating officer Bob, when faced with a 
complaint that has low possibility of prosecution, may check off “unfounded,” while 
investigating officer Bill, when faced with the same circumstances, may check off 
“departmental discretion.” Since we do not have reliable data on the investigating officers 
(and their characteristics) completing each report, this possibility cannot be explored 
within the scope of the current analysis. 
More important is the justification scenario that leads to a departmental discretion 
(DD) designation but not to an unfounded (U) designation: (lp)(RT). Police justify 
departmental discretion (DD) designations on the basis of rape typification (RT) alone. 
However, this is not the case for unfounded (U) designations. Thus, it can be argued that 
police do not justify an unfounded (U) designation on the basis of rape typification (RT) 
alone, only in conjunction with low prosecutability (LP) and may also do so on the basis 
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of low prosecutability (LP) alone. Police justify a departmental discretion (DD) 
designation on the basis of rape typification (RT) alone, in conjunction with low 
prosecutability (LP), and on the basis of low prosecutability (LP) alone.  
Another approach to solving the problem of contradictory outcomes is to go back 
to the data and rethink the coding process (Abell, 1989; Coverdill & Finlay, 1995). With 
this in mind, a second truth table (see Table 2) was developed looking at combinations of 
indicators for low prosecutability (evidence (E), credibility at question (C), incompetent 
witness (IW)) to determine if any pattern of configurations emerge.  
 
Table 2 
 
Truth Table for Unfounded and Departmental Discretion Designations for the Indicators 
of Low Prosecutability (LP) 
CONDITIONS OUTCOME 
Evidence 
(E) 
Credibility 
(C) 
Incompetent 
Witness (IW) 
Unfounded (U) Departmental  
Discretion (DD) 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 
1 0 0 3 5 
0 1 0 2 2 
0 0 1 0 3 
1 1 0 5 4 
0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
   10 14 
 
Again, the truth table is plagued by contradictory outcomes. However, it is 
instructive to point out that only the complaints with the incompetent witness (IW) 
condition lead to a departmental discretion (DD) designation. No unfounded (U) cases 
were justified on the basis of the complainant being thought of as an incompetent 
witness. Thus, whatever the status of the evidence and the credibility of the complainant, 
the presence of an incompetent witness led police to a departmental discretion (DD) 
designation rather than an unfounded (U) designation. 
It may also be argued that since unfounded (U) and departmental discretion (DD) 
designations ultimately lead to the same final outcome - complaint dropped at police 
level - it might be useful to think of the justification scenarios posited above as a contrast 
to the justification scenarios that would lead to complaints moving on to prosecution. 
 
Simplification 
 
Boolean methods of logical comparison represent each case as a combination of 
causal and outcome conditions. These combinations can be compared with each other and 
then logically simplified through a bottom-up process of paired comparison (Ragin, 
1993). Simplification, then, entails a series of paired comparisons between configurations 
that differ in only one respect with the result that is the causally-irrelevant term is 
dropped from the pair of configurations. The logic of simplification is described best in 
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this way: “If two combinations are identical in value for every attribute but one, then the 
two combinations can be combined into one configuration with that variable deleted” 
(Drass & Spencer, 1987, p. 287). A summary of this simplification process for the 
outcomes U and DD can be found below in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
Simplification of Outcomes 
Outcome 
(Designation) 
Combinations  
of Conditions 
Simplified 
Combinations 
of Conditions 
Logical 
Equations 
 
Unfounded (U) 
 
(LP) (RT) 
(LP) (rt) 
 
 
(LP) 
 
(LP) 
 
Unfounded (U) 
 
(E) (C) (iw) 
(e) (C) (iw) 
(E) (c) (iw) 
 
 
(C) (iw) 
(E) (iw) 
 
(C)(iw) + (E)(iw) 
 
Departmental  
Discretion (DD) 
 
(LP) (RT) 
(LP) (rt) 
(lp) (RT) 
 
 
(LP) 
(RT) 
 
(LP) + (RT) 
 
Departmental 
Discretion (DD) 
 
(E) (c) (iw) 
(E) (C) (iw) 
(e) (c) (iw) 
(e) (c) (IW) 
 
(E) (iw) 
(C) (iw) 
(e) (c) (IW) 
 
(E)(iw) + (C)(iw) + 
(e)(c)(IW) 
 
Logical Equations 
 
The end result of this simplification process is a prime-implicant equation (Ragin, 
1987, 1993). This equation is a shorthand representation summarizing the data in the 
truth table using only the logically essential prime implicants (Ragin, 1987), which 
provides a powerful basis for interfacing with theoretical ideas (Coverdill & Finlay, 
1995). The equation describes parsimoniously the different combinations of conditions 
associated with a certain outcome and allows for logically derived theories about the 
nature of the phenomenon under investigation. 
The logical equations for the outcomes are as follows: 
 U = (LP)   and  U = (E)(iw) + (C)(iw) 
 DD = (LP) + (RT)  and  DD = (E)(iw) + (C)(iw) + (e)(c)(IW) 
  
Where:   
 LP = Low Prosecutability  U = Unfounded Designation 
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 RT = Rape Typification  DD = Departmental Discretion Designation 
 E = Evidentiary Concerns 
 C = Credibility at Question 
 IW = Incompetent Witness 
  
What these equations essentially mean is that low prosecutability (LP) is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for police to designate a complaint as unfounded (U). 
Low prosecutability (LP) must be present for U to occur. In other words, investigating 
officers will not choose to “unfound” a sexual assault complaint unless they perceive the 
likelihood of successful prosecution to be low, regardless of any other circumstances. 
Breaking this down a little further, police perceive low prosecutability (LP) on the basis 
of either evidentiary concerns (E) or question of complainant’s credibility (C), regardless 
of whether the complainant is perceived as an incompetent witness (iw). Neither 
evidentiary concerns (E) nor credibility questioned (C) is necessary to produce an 
unfounded (U) designation, but either one is sufficient to justify an unfounded (U) 
designation, so long as the complainant is not perceived as an incompetent witness 
((E)(iw) + (C)(iw)). An investigating officer may select the “unfounded” designation 
because there are perceived problems concerning evidence or because the complainant’s 
credibility is at question, both of which may render successful prosecution unlikely. It is 
not likely, however, that a witness perceived as incompetent will lead an investigating 
officer to “unfound” a complaint, unless either evidentiary concerns or question of 
victim’s credibility is present. Furthermore, neither low prosecutability (LP) nor rape 
typification (RT) is necessary to produce a departmental discretion (DD) designation, but 
either one is sufficient to justify a departmental discretion (DD) designation (LP + RT). 
An investigating officer may select the “departmental discretion” designation because 
successful prosecution is perceived as unlikely or because he or she is relying on a rape 
typification. Again, breaking this down further, regardless of whether the complainant is 
perceived as an incompetent witness (iw), either evidentiary concerns (E) or credibility 
questioned (C) is sufficient to justify a departmental discretion (DD) designation ((E)(iw) 
+ (C)(iw)). In addition, when the complainant is perceived as an incompetent witness 
(IW), regardless of whether there are evidentiary concerns (e) or credibility at question 
(c), this is enough to justify a departmental discretion (DD) designation. Like the decision 
to “unfound” a sexual assault complaint, either evidentiary concerns or credibility 
questioned may lead an investigating officer to select the “departmental discretion” 
designation. However, unlike the above scenario, if a complainant is perceived to be an 
incompetent witness this may also lead to a “departmental discretion” designation. 
 
Discussion 
 
On the basis of police justifications, it appears that police are likely to employ the 
legal model of decision-making when designating complaints as “unfounded”. Police 
justify “unfounded” designations on the basis of perceptions that a complaint has a 
relatively low chance of successful prosecution; in particular, when there may be 
insufficient or contradictory evidence and/or when the complainant’s credibility is at 
question. For example, in one complaint of sexual assault designated as “unfounded” it 
was noted by investigating officers that the story of sexual assault had surfaced only after 
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the complainant had been confronted with her infidelity by her common-law spouse 
(complainant’s credibility at question - ulterior motive suspected) and that there was no 
evidence to support her allegation (insufficient evidence). Perceptions of low 
prosecutability may be accompanied by rape typification. For example, in one complaint 
not only did investigating officers note the lack of evidence and the questionability of the 
complainant’s credibility, but also noted that the victim’s reaction was not “typical”: 
“During the interview, the complainant laughed and did not seem the least bit troubled by 
what should have been a traumatic experience for her.” However, rape typification does 
not seem to be enough to justify an “unfounded” designation. On the other hand, the 
perception of low prosecutability is both a necessary and a sufficient condition to justify 
an “unfounded” designation. On the basis of insufficient/contradictory evidence or shaky 
credibility, complaints are either proved to be or believed to be false and hence warrant 
an “unfounded” designation. 
In addition, it appears that police are also likely to employ the legal model of 
decision-making when assigning complaints a “departmental discretion” designation. 
When police perceive a complaint as having a low chance of successful prosecution they 
may designate that complaint as “unfounded” or they may designate it as “departmental 
discretion.” Which designation they choose may be the result of the idiosyncrasies of 
individual officers (we might discover, for example, that some officers routinely use 
“departmental discretion” designations while others routinely use “unfounded” 
designations, when employing the same justifications). What separates a “departmental 
discretion” designation from an “unfounded” designation, in terms of legal criteria, may 
be whether the complainant is perceived as an incompetent witness. For example, the 
police decided not to proceed by laying charges in one incident involving a young girl 
with cerebral palsy on the basis that “she would not be able to testify because she doesn’t 
handle crowds well, she becomes easily confused, wouldn’t be able to face the suspect 
and might refuse to talk.” Subsequently, the investigating officers felt that the victim 
would not make a very competent witness. However, the perception that the complainant 
would be an incompetent witness was not cited as the sole justification in any of the 
“unfounded” complaints. 
Police are also likely to employ the extralegal model when designating complaints 
under “departmental discretion.” “Departmental discretion” designations may by justified 
on the basis of a rape typification alone without perceptions of low prosecutability. For 
example, after one woman reported that she was sexually assaulted investigating officers 
commented immediately: “As the complainant is a known prostitute, this allegation is 
most likely nothing more than a trick going bad.” Consequently, they did not pursue the 
complaint with criminal charges. In another case in which the suspect admitted to the 
sexual assault allegation the investigating officers justified their designation on the basis 
that the victim was uncooperative: “It has been decided that because of the victim’s 
defiant attitude that a charge would not be laid in this matter”. As a contrast, none of the 
“unfounded” complaints were justified on the basis of rape typification alone. 
Thus, it could be argued that police employ both the legal and extralegal models 
of decision-making in designating sexual assault complaints. The legal model is most 
apparent in “unfounded” designations while both the legal and extralegal models are 
apparent in designations falling under “departmental discretion.” It may be that 
“departmental discretion” serves as a catch-all category when an “unfounded” 
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designation cannot be justified by some investigating officers or when extralegal factors 
come into play. 
It should be noted that the data in this analysis were limited to written 
justifications contained in police investigation reports. It has already been acknowledged 
that such indicated justifications may not capture all or even most of the important 
conditions relevant to police decision-making. Conceivably, police also make or justify 
decisions on the basis of factors/conditions that are not specifically written in reports. It 
has been noted, for example, that characteristics of the investigating police officers 
themselves may be an important factor impacting decision-making. A male officer may 
be more likely than a female officer to designate a sexual assault complaint as 
“unfounded” or to decide not to proceed with the complaint after a preliminary 
investigation. 
QCA is, of course, limited by data (Coverdill et al., 1994). It is therefore 
suggested that further data be collected on police justifications for designations of sexual 
assault complaints. This can be accomplished through interviews with investigating 
officers and through participant observation of routine police decisions and actions. QCA 
can then be applied to expand the analysis and to reveal unique justification scenarios for 
particular designations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Decision-making, like many social-psychological processes, is a “lumpy” process. 
In designating sexual assault complaints, police do not make decisions on the basis of 
individual factors in isolation from each other, but in combination with one another. 
Previous studies regarding police decisions in sexual assault complaints have failed to 
take into account the combinatorial nature of decision-making, relying instead on additive 
linear analyses. 
Qualitative comparative analysis, with its holistic combinatorial logic and 
emphasis on causal heterogeneity is an approach thought to be advantageous in exploring 
the complexity of social life and in maintaining a dialogue that promotes new ways of 
thinking. The application of QCA to data, collected in an earlier study, on police 
justifications for designations of sexual assault complaints, filtered out at the police level, 
revealed important scenarios unique to “unfounded” and “departmental discretion” 
designations. These scenarios lent support to both the legal and extralegal models of 
decision-making as well as affirmed the importance of looking at decision-making 
combinatorially. 
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